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                                                                  Abstract
“Single-world”  unitary quantum theories imply  that  some measurements  have results  whose probabilities  can not  be
calculated by the Born rule.
The quantum measurement problem: If quantum states evolve unitarily, how can measurements objectively have
single outcomes?  Well, perhaps quantum states do not evolve unitarily (eg the GRW theory [1]).  Or perhaps
measurements do not have single outcomes (eg many-worlds [2]).  Or perhaps quantum states themselves are
not objective (eg perspectival states [3] or Quantum Bayesism [4]).  
In this note I discuss theories in which it is assumed that quantum states  do evolve unitarily and that there
nevertheless are single, objective results the probabilities of which can be calculated by the Born Rule. I will refer
to these as BRUQ theories (for Born-rule-unitary-quantum theories).  It has been argued (e.g. in refs. [5] - [9])
that  such  theories  cannot  meet  the  requirements  of  locality  and/or  of  Lorentz  invariance.   Without  even
considering those requirements, I will show that a BRUQ theory suffers from the following trouble: there can be
measurement results whose probability cannot be calculated.
Consider a simple story in which Alice and Bob share a laboratory.  The entire story will  take place in that
laboratory, and only a single Lorentz frame will be used;  we will not have to consider any constraints from
locality or Lorentz invariance.  There is in the laboratory a system called  S; the initial state of this system is
1
√2 (|1 + |2).  At time t = 1, Alice makes a measurement of S, with result either “1” or “2”.  Let P(A1) denote
the probability that  her result is “1”.  Bob does not see her result; at time t = 3 he makes his own measurement
on this  same system  S;  let  P(B1) denote  the probability  that  the result  of  Bob's  measurement  is  “1”,  and
P(A1∧B1) denote the probability that  Alice's result and Bob's result are both “1”.  Let Ψ(t) denote the quantum
state vector for the entire laboratory at time t;  at t = 0.5, which is before Alice’s measurement, Ψ is
          Ψ(0.5) = 1√2 (|1+|2)|Ar|Br|Er                                                                                       (1)                  
where |Ar is the quantum state vector of Alice before she has made any measurement (but is ready to do so);
likewise |Br is the quantum state vector of Bob before he has made any measurement. The system E includes
everything else in the laboratory; |Er   is the quantum state vector of E before any measurement. It follows from
eq. (1) and the Born Rule that P(A1) = 0.5.
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At t = 1.5, which is after Alice’s measurement but before Bob’s, Ψ becomes
          Ψ(1.5) = 1√2 [(|1   |A1|E1 ) +(|2|A2|E2)]|Br                                                           (2)            
where |A1   (|A2) are state vectors of Alice where she has seen results “1” (resp. “2”); with analogous meanings
for  |E1 (|E2 ).  It follows from eq. 2 and the Born rule that P(B1) = 0.5.  Of course, the values of P(A1) and
P(B1) do not determine the value of P(A1∧B1) (unless either P(A1) or P(B1) were zero, which is not the case
here).  That value can be determined from eq. (2) by considering a measurement on the combined system of S
and Alice of a observable whose associated operator has  |1|A1   as an eigenvector.   The Born rule then
implies that P(A1∧B1)= 0.5.
So we have P(A1) = 0.5, P(B1) = 0.5, and P(A1∧B1) = 0.5.  So far, there is no trouble.  But consider a second
version of our story: it’s the same as the first version, except that at time t = 2 the quantum state of the laboratory
is reset to its original value; that is, the laboratory undergoes a unitary evolution which is the inverse of the
evolution  that  occurred  during  Alice’s  measurement.   Of  course  that  would  be  impossible  to  implement  in
practice (a similar story in ref [9] invokes a “superobserver’ with the power to reset the quantum state of a
macroscopic system) but it is allowed in principle by the rules of unitary quantum theory.  
I will  use the letter  Φ to denote quantum state vectors in this second version, to avoid confusion with state
vectors in the first version as given above.  Before Alice’s measurement the state vector for the laboratory is the
same as in the first version (eq. 1):
          Φ(0.5) = 1√2 (|1+|2)|Ar|Br|Er                                                                                      (3)                
   
From this and the Born rule, we see that P(A1) = 0.5.                                                             
At t = 1.5, which is after Alice’s measurement but before the reset, the state vector is the same as in the first
version (eq. 2):
          Φ(1.5) = 1√2 [(|1   |A1|E1 ) +(|2|A2|E2)]|Br                                                             (4)             
However, we learn nothing about Bob’s result from eq. (4).  The Born rule, applied to  Φ(1.5), would give the
probability of a measurement which is made when the state vector is Φ(1.5) , but that is not what Bob does.  We
can calculate P(B1) from the state vector at t = 2.5, which, due to the reset,  is the same as it was at t=0.5:
          Φ(2.5) = 1√2 (|1+|2)|Ar|Br|Er                                                                                        (5) 
and we see that P(B1) = 0.5 (same as in the first version).
                                                                            
The trouble is that there is now no way to use the Born rule to calculate P(A1∧B1).  Eq. 4 tells us nothing about
Bob’s result, and eq. 5 tells us nothing about Alice’s result.  One might want to conjecture that, since there is no
obvious reason for Alice’s result and Bob’s result to be correlated, they should be statistically independent; that
would imply that P(A1∧B1) = 0.25.  Unfortunately, that conjecture is not supported by any Born rule calculation,
and in fact is, as we shall see below, contradicted by what we would expect from Bohmian mechanics.
In  Bohmian mechanics (for  a summary  of  Bohmian mechanics,  see ref.  [10]),  the quantum state  vector  is
supplemented by an actual position for the particle, which I will call the “Bohm position”; the dynamics of the
Bohm position is such that the probability of the Bohm position being in a certain place is equal to the probability
that a measurement of position would find it there.  For our story, let the system S be a particle which could be in
one of two boxes; |1 is the state vector of the particle if the particle is in box #1, and |2  the state vector if the
particle is in box #2.  With the usual choice of a measurement Hamiltonian, a wave packet which starts in box #1
will never overlap in space with a wave packet which starts in box #2; that implies that the Bohm position will not
travel from one box to the other.  With probability 0.5 the Bohm position will start in box #1, in which case it
would stay there for the entire duration of the story, and so both Alice and Bob would see result “1”.  Thus
P(A1∧B1) = 0.5 (as in the first version). This is not in conflict with the assertion that a BRUQ theory does not
permit  a calculation of  P(A1∧B1).  This Bohmian calculation relies on the postulated dynamics of  the Bohm
position, not on the Born rule; therefore Bohmian mechanics does not meet the definition I have made of a
BRUQ theory.  The “trouble” in the title of this note does not occur in Bohmian mechanics; it would occur in any
unitary theory in which probabilities are just those that follow from the Born rule.
Final observation: In many interpretations of quantum theory, probabilities can only be assigned to observed
results.  In the second version of the story I have just told, after the quantum state is reset Alice's result is not
observable; all records of it, including any in Alice's memory, have been erased.  So perhaps P(A1∧B1) should
not be considered to be a meaningful quantity.  But to the extent that it  is meaningful, it is an example of a
probability to which a BRUQ theory does not assign a value.  
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